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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
LORNA STALLINGS, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. 
} Case No. 20060914-CA 
) District Ct. No. 051905453 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty by a jury in the Second District 
Court for one count of Distribution of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free 
Zone, a first-degree felony. The Defendant was convicted at jury trial held on 
August 17, 2006, with the Honorable Roger S. Dutson presiding and was 
sentenced on October 2, 2006, to serve an indeterminate term of five years to life 
at the Utah State Prison. The Defendant is currently in the Utah State Prison. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE? 
Preservation of issue on appeal: This issue was preserved for the appeal by the 
timely motion to dismiss made by the Defendant. (R. 93/182) 
Standard of Review: This issue should be reviewed under a correction of error 
standard of review. "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, 
we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." Spanish Fork City v. Biyan, 975 P.2d 
501, 502 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(citations omitted). "However, before we can 
uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence conceming 
each element of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] may base its 
conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. The trial court's legal 
conclusions should be reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
936 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii). Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with one count of Distribution 
of a Controlled Substance (cocaine), a first-degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. 
§58-37-8. The Defendant pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. 
On August 17, 2006, the Defendant appeared for jury trial, and the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty. The Defendant was sentenced on October 2, 2006, to 
serve an indeterminate term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison and is 
currently incarcerated serving that term. The Sentence, Judgment and 
Commitment was signed on October 6, 2006, and a Notice of Appeal was filed on 
October 6, 2006. (R. 73) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case revolves around a controlled drug purchase which occurred on 
October 14, 2005. The Weber Morgan strike force's Officer Watanabe and 
Officer Grogan were utilizing a confidential informant by the name of Brian 
Eames (CI) in an attempt to make a controlled purchase of crack cocaine. 
(R.93/86) The original target of the controlled drug purchase was an individual by 
the name of Kyerinda. These parties had set up a proposed purchase of $100.00 
of cocaine to be accomplished in a parking lot at 12th and Harrison in Ogden, 
Utah. (R. 93/86) Once all of the parties arrived at a parking lot Kyerinda inform 
them that she did not have any cocaine and that she needed to contact a third 
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party in order to obtain the drugs (R. 93/86). Due to the fact that Kyerinda was 
the target of the original investigation, when she decided to contact a third party 
to obtain drugs the officers were unable to search Kyerinda at the risk of blowing 
their cover. (R. 93/104) Officer Watanabe acknowledged that he had never heard 
the name Lorna Stallings involved in drugs. (R. 93/99) He also acknowledged 
that he had not seen the transaction, and specifically that he had never seen the 
Defendant handle drugs in any way (R. 93/106) 
Kyerinda indicated that she had called the Defendant by cell phone and 
arranged a meeting with her at the Minimart located at 12th and Monroe in 
Ogden, Utah. (R. 93/89) This meeting occurred in a public parking lot within 
500 feet of a church, both of which would qualify as drug-free zones (R. 93/89). 
The CI, Officer Grogan, and Kyerinda then drove to the Minimart to make 
the purchase of cocaine. The CI testified that after arriving at the minimart 
Kyerinda left their vehicle, went into another vehicle and in approximately 30 
seconds came back with some drugs. (R. 93/118) After some transaction 
occurred in the parking lot, where the CI gave Kyerinda one rock of cocaine, the 
CI and Officer Grogan left the Minimart, went back to the parking lot at 12th and 
Hanison. (R. 93/119) The CI testified that he never observed any money or 
drugs passed between Kyerinda and the Defendant. (R. 93/125) The CI and 
Officer Grogan then went to meet up with Officer Watanabe. At that point the CI 
gave the cocaine to the officers. Kyerinda was not arrested at the time nor 
searched (R. 93/94); however, the Defendant was briefly stopped on a pretext 
traffic violation to ascertain identity. 
Kyerinda Gonzales testified at trial regarding this incident. She 
acknowledged that she was currently serving time in prison for a second-degree 
felony distribution of drugs. (R. 93/130) She admitted that she had never 
previously observed the Defendant with drugs and had never arranged a purchase 
of drugs from the defendant before. (R. 93/137) She did, however, testify that 
she gave the Defendant money and in turn took some dope (R. 93/142). 
Officer Shawn Grogan testified at trial that he was working as an 
undercover officer for the Weber/Morgan narcotics strike force at the time of the 
alleged incident. The officer remained in the vehicle while Kyerinda went to a 
vehicle in which the Defendant was located to make the purchase (R. 93/162). 
Officer Grogan testified that the two vehicles were positioned side-by-side ( R. 
93/161); however, Kyerinda had testified earlier that the vehicles were "parked 
nose to nose" (R. 93/150). Officer Grogan testified that Kyerinda got into the 
backseat of the car in which the Defendant was sitting (R. 93/175). Kyerinda, on 
the other hand, testified that she never got into the vehicle, but rather dropped the 
money into the Defendant's lap and reached in and grabbed the dope from the 
Defendant's lap (R.. 93/142, 149). 
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Officer Grogan testified that he did not actually see the "exchange hand to 
hand between the Defendant and Kyerinda." (R. 93/169) Officer Grogan believes 
that the transaction occurred while Kyerinda was sitting in the rear seat of the 
Defendant's car. The only thing that the officer observed was the Defendant 
lifting the $100 bill to look at it in the light (R. 93/169). 
Several days later the officers went to Kyerinda home to make an arrest for 
a previous buy that she had been involved in. When they arrived Officer Grogan 
had a police badge hanging around his neck and his fellow officer, Agent 
Johnson, had a hat that described him as a member of the Weber/Morgan 
narcotics strike force (R. 93/167). Kyerinda admitted that she was so high on 
drugs that she did not notice either of those facts and attempted to sell the two 
officers drugs (R. 93/154). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The evidence as presented at trial was insufficient to support a conviction. 
The Defendant was charged with distribution of controlled substance. The 
evidence at trial suggests that the guilty party was Kyerinda rather than the 
Defendant. The only evidence that indicated the Defendant was instrumental in 
the transaction is that of the convicted felon Kyerinda. Both the officer as well as 
the confidential informant was unable to see the transaction occur. Due to the 
fact that Kyerinda was the original target of the controlled drug purchase she had 
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not been searched either prior to the transaction. It was therefore incumbent upon 
the jury to believe her testimony that the transaction occurred in the way that she 
testified and that the Defendant supplied cocaine to her in exchange for $100. 
While the Defendant recognizes that the appellate courts are reluctant to 
overturn a jury verdict, they will do so in a situation where the testimony 
produced at trial is so lacking in believability that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a doubt. In this case the jury was required to rely solely upon the 
testimony of a known a drug addict. Her recitation of the supposed facts of the 
transaction was so different from the testimony of both the undercover officer and 
the confidential informant as to lack any degree of believability. A reasonable 
jury should have found reasonable doubt and acquitted the Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE. 
The due process clause "protects the accused against conviction except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged." In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The 
Defendant recognizes the relatively high bar she must reach in order to establish 
an insufficient evidence claim. In case of State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 
* 1190 (Utah App.,1993) this Court held: 
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When challenging a jury's verdict, the defendant must show the 
evidence and its inferences are so "inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983). "[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable 
inferences support the jury's findings, [the appellate court] will 
not disturb them." Moore, 802 P.2d at 738; accord State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient 
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court 
may overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985(Utah 1993), 
the Court reversed a conviction of sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A 
guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to 
only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution 
presented no evidence, expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could 
have been taken for purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the 
Court vacated the defendant's guilty verdict. 
Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) the 
Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second degree murder case 
where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case there was undisputed 
evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole evidence against the 
defendant consisted of the fact that the defendant was the last person seen with 
the victim, and the fact that he had related a dream to three individuals in which 
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he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he hurt her. He thought he might 
have killed her." (Id at 446) In that case the Court stated: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to 
the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as 
far as it will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a 
speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to 
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, f 18 63 
P.3d 94 the Court, again recognizing the significant standard of review required 
to reverse a conviction in an insufficient evidence appeal, reversed the trial 
court's conviction of evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert 
testimony that opined that a second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder 
of an individual. No other evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was 
recovered) was found, but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the 
defendant had the motive and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In 
reversing that conviction, the Court held: 
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the 
defendant's] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the 
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had the 
opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it 
ever existed. (Id. at f^ 18) 
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While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an extensive 
marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. The seminal 
problem in the case is that the only testimony that establishes that the Defendant, 
rather than Kyerinda sold the cocaine is the testimony of Kyerinda herself. This 
is the same Kyerinda that was serving time for a distribution of cocaine charge, 
and the same individual who was so high on drugs that she tried to sell drugs to 
an officer with a badge gleaming on his chest mere inches from Kyerinda's face. 
In the case at bar, the statute the Defendant was convicted of reads that the 
Defendant; "did knowingly or intentionally distribute a controlled substance, or 
did agree, consent, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance..." 
U.C.A. §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii). 
The Defendant recognizes that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 
in a jury verdict, the standard of review is narrow. See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)(emphasis 
added) 
n 
An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. 
State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1987). As long as there is some evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, "from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." {State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d at 345.) 
In the present case the reasonable inferences are so "inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the Defendant committed the crime". 
Here we have a situation where the Defendant was not on any radar screen 
of the Weber/Morgan strike force. The confidential informant had never met her, 
and in fact at trial was unable to even make an identification. Officer Grogan had 
no indication that the Defendant was involved in the drug scene. Neither the 
confidential informant nor Officer Grogan were able to testify that they saw a 
transaction occur. The only individual that could testify regarding the transaction 
was Kyerinda, who was a convicted felon and so strung out on drugs that a couple 
days following the alleged transaction she tried to sell drugs to two clearly 
identified police officers. 
The testimony of Kyerinda is so improbable that reasonable minds must 
have doubted the veracity of the story she concocted. Her testimony as to the 
position of the vehicles was directly contradictory to both the confidential 
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informant and the undercover police officer. Her testimony as to the only 
physical elements of the alleged transaction that was observable by the CI and the 
undercover officer (i.e., that she did not get into the Defendant's vehicle) is 
directly opposite the testimony of both the CI and the undercover officer. The 
fact that Kyerinda was not searched prior to the transaction would have easily 
allowed her to give the $100 to the Defendant in payment of a past debt rather 
than for the purchase of cocaine. It is instructive to note that both officers 
involved distrusted Kyerinda to the extent that they would not let her out of their 
sight with the hundred-dollar bill due to fears that she would take the money and 
run. 
All of the above facts support the Defendant's position that she did not 
deliver any drugs to Kyerinda. If no drugs were given to Kyerinda by the 
Defendant, the Defendant could therefore not be convicted of the crime charged. 
This leaves the court in this situation where, like the court in State v. Booker 
infra, where the evidence was so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime." 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the forgoing the Defendant respectively requests this court to 
determine that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a 
n 
conviction. The Defendant requests that this court therefore reverse the trial court 
and remand with instructions to enter a dismissalrd\all charges 
DATED this 9 aay of April 2007 
RKNDALL % RICHARDS 
Antorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Ryan Tenney, Assistant Attorney General, AttomeyTbr the Pl^mtim 160 East 
300 South, 6th FJQOT, PO Box 140854, Salt Lak/c iM Utah §4l 14-0J 80, gQstaj 
prepaid this <^~day~of April 2007. ^~ 
LNDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDUM A 
15 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V£ 
LORNA STALLINGS, 
Defendant 
001
 0 6 2008 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE , JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051905453 FS 
Judge: ROGER S DUTSON 
Date: October 2, 2006 
PRESENT 
Clerk: carier 
Reporter: OLSEN, DEAN 
Prosecutor: LYON, NATHAN D 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 10, 1965 
Video 
Tape Number: RSD10 02 0 6 Tape Count: 3 03 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 1 s t D e g r e e Fe lony 
P l e a : G u i l t y - D i s p o s i t i o n : 08 /17 /2006 G u i l t y 
HEARING 
This is time set for APP Sentencing. The defendant is present in 
custody from the Weber County Jail with counsel. A presentence 
investigation report has been submitted to the Court. No objections 
are made. Court proceeds with sentencing. 
Case No: 051905453 
Date: Oct 02, 2006 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
The defendant shall pay a fine of $100.00, which shall be collected 
through the board of pardons upon parole. 
The Court recommends the defendant complete a drug treatment 
program at the Utah State Prison. 
/? 
0 Dated t h i s ^> day of (J/UcJ^^/^ , 2'\ 
ir 
\ 
/k 
tfOGER & DUTSON 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e 
ADDENDUM B 
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ABOUT. 
DON ' T 
HONOR. 
STAND 
NOW, MAYBE, 
KNOW WHAT YOU 
MR. COLE: 
MR. MILES: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MILES: 
YOU KNOW, IF -- I DON'T KNOW WHAT — I 
WANT. 
THAT'S ALL THE QUESTIONS I HAVE, YOUR 
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR. 
ALL RIGHT. THIS WITNESS MAY BE EXCUSED. 
STATE CALLS KYERINDA GONZALEZ TO THE 
MAY I PROCEED? 
KYERINDA GONZALEZ, 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED 
AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MILES: 
Q. WILL YOU STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE COURT PLEASE? 
A. KYERINDA GONZALEZ. 
Q. AND CAN YOU SPELL THE FIRST NAME? 
A. K-Y-E-R-I-N-D-A. 
Q. AND THEN YOUR LAST NAME, DOES IT END IN A Z.? 
A. YEP. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. MS. GONZALEZ, WHERE ARE YOU CURRENTLY 
RESIDING? 
A. RIGHT NOW? 
Q. YEAH. 
A. UTAH STATE PRISON. 
Q. OKAY. HOW LONG WILL YOU BE THERE TIL? 
130 
A. NOVEMBER. 
Q. OF? 
A. 2006. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. WHY ARE YOU IN PRISON? 
A. FOR SECOND DEGREE FELONY, DISTRIBUTION. 
Q. DISTRIBUTION OF DRUGS? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. IS THAT FOR WHAT HAPPENED ON OCTOBER 14TH OF 2005? 
A. YES. 
Q. YOU WERE SUBPOENAED TO TESTIFY HERE TODAY; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. OKAY. IS IT FAIR TO SAY YOU DON'T WANT TO BE HERE? 
A. YES. 
Q. DO YOU KNOW BRIAN EAMES. 
A. YES, I DO. 
Q. HOW DO YOU KNOW BRIAN EAMES? 
A. HE USED TO CALL ME FOR SOME DOPE. 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER SEEING BRIAN EAMES ON OCTOBER 14TH OF 
2005? 
A. YEP. 
Q. DO YOU KNOW LORNA STALLINGS? 
A. I DO. 
2 4 | Q. HOW DO YOU KNOW LORNA? 
A. THROUGH A FRIEND. 
131 
Q. DID YOU KNOW LORNA ON OCTOBER 14TH OF 2005? 
A. I DID. 
Q. AND APPROXIMATELY FOR HOW LONG PRIOR TO THAT DATE HAD YOU 
KNOWN HER? 
A. I DON'T KNOW. OGDEN'S SMALL. 
Q. I MEAN TIME-WISE, HAD YOU KNOWN HER FOR YEARS AT THAT 
TIME, MONTHS, DAYS? 
A. YEAH, YEARS. 
Q. SO IS IT FAIR TO SAY YOU WOULD RECOGNIZE HER IF YOU SAW 
HER AGAIN? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. IS PRESENT HERE IN COURT? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. CAN YOU INDICATE WHERE SHE IS FOR THE JURY PLEASE? 
A. OVER THERE. 
MR. MILES: OKAY. LET THE RECORD REFLECT THE 
WITNESS IS INDICATING THE DEFENDANT. 
Q. (BY MR. MILES) DO YOU RECALL RECEIVING A TELEPHONE CALL 
FROM BRIAN EAMES ON OCTOBER 14TH OF 2005? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. WHAT DID MR. EAMES WANT? 
A. CRACK. 
Q. HE WANTED TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO PURCHASE CRACK FROM 
YOU? 
A. YEAH. 
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Q. OKAY. WHAT WERE THE ARRANGEMENTS YOU MADE WITH 
MR. EAMES? 
A. THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO MEET ME SOMEWHERE. 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER WHERE? 
A. SMITH'S. 
Q. SMITH'S ON 12TH AND --
A. HARRISON. 
Q. -- HARRISON. WHAT HAPPENED WHEN YOU ARRIVED AT SMITH'S 
AT 12TH AND HARRISON? 
A. SOMEBODY DIDN'T COME THROUGH. 
Q. WHEN YOU SAY SOMEBODY DIDN'T COME THROUGH, WHAT DO YOU 
MEAN BY THAT? 
A. THE PERSON THAT I CALLED DIDN'T COME THROUGH. 
Q. OKAY. YOU HAD TO CALL SOMEBODY TO GET THE DRUGS? 
A. YEAH. 
'Q. DID YOU HAVE ANY DRUGS ON YOU AT THAT TIME? 
A. NO. 
Q. YOU MET WITH MR. EAMES IN THE PARKING LOT, CORRECT? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. OKAY. DO YOU RECALL WAS MR. EAMES ALONE? 
A. NO. 
Q. OKAY. THERE WAS ANOTHER PERSON WITH MR. EAMES? 
A. (WITNESS NODS.) 
Q-
A. 
DO YOU KNOW WHO THAT PERSON IS NOW? 
YES. 
n - 3 
X _-> w> 
1 Q. OKAY. WHO WAS THAT PERSON? 
2 A. UNDERCOVER COP. 
3 Q. WHAT WAS YOUR INTENTION THEN WHEN YOU ARRIVED AT THE 
A SMITH'S PARKING LOT WITH MR. EAMES WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT WITH 
5 THIS UNDERCOVER COP?• 
6 A. GET HIM SOME DRUGS. 
7 Q. OKAY. AND WHAT WERE THE ARRANGEMENTS? WHAT WERE YOU 
8 GONNA GET FOR HIM? 
9 A. MY SHARE, A DUB, $20 OF ROCK. 
10 Q. YOU CALL THAT A DUB? 
11 A. YEAH. 
12 Q. THAT'S A ROCK OF COCAINE OR $20 WORTH? 
13 A. UH-HUH. 
14 Q. HOW MUCH WAS HE GONNA PURCHASE FROM YOU? 
15 A. A HUNDRED. 
16 Q. $100 WORTH OF CRACK COCAINE? 
17 A. UH-HUH. 
18 Q. THAT WOULD BE FIVE OR SO DUBS? 
19 A. YES. 
20 Q. OKAY. SO WHAT HAPPENED THEN IN TERMS OF YOUR DISCUSSION? 
21 DID YOU GO OUT AND MEET WITH MR. EAMES AND THEN THE 
22 UNDERCOVER OFFICER WHO YOU IDENTIFIED LATER? 
23 A. YEAH. 
24 Q. DID YOU TALK WITH THEM? 
25 A. (WITNESS NODS.) 
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Q. OKAY. TELL US WHAT HAPPENED DURING THAT DISCUSSION. 
A. I DIDN'T COME THROUGH, SO WE HAD TO WAIT FOP SOMEBODY 
ELSE. 
Q. MEANING YOU DIDN'T HAVE THE CRACK COCAINE ON YOU AT THE 
TIME; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. UH-HUH, YEAH. 
Q. DID THEY HAVE THE MONEY ON THEM? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. WERE THEY PREPARED TO PAY YOU FOR THAT? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. WHAT DID YOU WANNA DO WITH THE MONEY IN ORDER TO 
GET THEM THE DRUGS? 
A. GO GET SOME, GO TAKE AND GO GET SOME. 
Q. DID THEY LET YOU DO THAT? 
A. NO. 
Q. DID YOU DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, GUARANTEES OF 
WHY YOU WOULD COME BACK? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. WHAT WERE THOSE DISCUSSIONS? 
A. MY BROTHER WOULD STAY HERE. 
Q. OKAY. YOUR BROTHER IS AN ADULT, RIGHT? SO YOU'RE NOT 
LEAVING A CHILD WITH THEM. 
A. YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. ALL RIGHT. SO WHAT HAPPENED THEN WHEN THEY 
REFUSED TO HOLD YOUR BROTHER AS RANSOM FOR THE DRUGS? 
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1 A. NOTHING. 
2 Q. THAT WASN'T THE END OF THE DEAL, CORRECT? 
3 A. YEAH. 
4 Q. YOU EVENTUALLY GOT THE DRUGS. 
5 A. UH-HUH. 
6 Q. OKAY. TELL US HOW THAT CAME ABOUT. 
7 A. AND THEN I CALLED SOMEBODY ELSE, A FRIEND. 
8 Q. OKAY. YOU KEEP SAYING SOMEBODY ELSE, BUT YOU KNOW WHO 
9 THAT SOMEBODY ELSE IS, CORRECT? 
10 A. YEAH. 
11 Q. WHO WAS THAT SOMEBODY ELSE? 
12 A. (WITNESS NODS.) 
13 Q. OKAY. YOU'RE GONNA HAVE TO SAY IT OUT LOUD. YOU'RE 
14 INDICATING TOWARDS THE DEFENDANT? 
15 A. CORRECT. 
16 Q. YOU'RE CALLING THE DEFENDANT? 
17 A. YEAH. 
18 Q. OKAY. WHAT DID YOU TALK WITH THE DEFENDANT ABOUT? 
19 A. NOTHING. MEET ME SOMEWHERE. 
20 Q. OKAY. WHERE WAS MEET ME? WHERE WERE YOU TO MEET? 
21 A. 12TH STREET. 
22 Q. 12TH STREET AND WHERE? 
23 A. MONROE. 
24 Q. WAS IT AT A GAS STATION THEN? 
25 A. YEAH. 
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Q. OKAY. AND I'LL SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AND ADMITTED 
AS STATE'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 1. DO YOU RECOGNIZE WHAT'S 
DEPICTED IN THIS PHOTOGRAPH? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. AND WHAT IS THAT? 
A. THAT'S THE GAS STATION. 
Q. OKAY. THIS IS THE GAS STATION THAT YOU HAD THE MEETING 
AT? 
A. (WITNESS NODS.) 
Q. OKAY. 
A. YEAH. 
Q. DO YOU RECALL THEN HOW DID YOU GET FROM SMITH'S ON 12TH 
AND HARRISON TO THE GAS STATION ON 12TH AND MONROE? 
A. WITH BRIAN. 
Q. OKAY. YOU RODE IN THEIR VEHICLE? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. OKAY. DO YOU RECALL WHAT KIND OF VEHICLE THEY HAD? 
A. A JEEP. 
Q. DO YOU KNOW WHERE YOU WERE IN THE VEHICLE? 
A. I WAS IN THE FRONT. I THINK IN FRONT. 
Q. SO YOU'D CALLED THE DEFENDANT AND SAID YOU WANTED HER TO 
MEET YOU OR DID SHE TELL YOU TO MEET HER 
12TH AND MONROE? 
A. I SAID I WANT TO MEET. 
Q. OKAY. AND THAT WAS THE LOCATION YOU 
AT THIS LOCATION AT 
DISCUSSED? 
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1 | A. YEAH. 
2 | Q. AND WHY DID YOU WANNA MEET HER THERE? 
A. QUICKEST I CAN GET IT OVER WITH. 
Q. OKAY. OR IT'S SEVERAL BLOCKS AWAY INSTEAD OF MILES, 
5 I RIGHT? 
6 | A. YEAH. 
7 | Q. OKAY. HOW DID YOU KNOW LORNA WOULD HAVE DRUGS? 
A. AROUND. 
9 I Q. AROUND 
10 j A. OGDEN'S PRETTY SMALL, LIKE I SAID. 
11 Q. OKAY. DID YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT SHE HAD 
12 DRUGS? 
13 A. NO. 
14 Q. YOU'D WITNESSED HER PERSONALLY? 
15 A. NO. 
16 Q. ARE YOU SURE? 
17 A. WHAT DO YOU MEAN? 
18 Q. HADN'T YOU EVER SEEN HER WITH DRUGS BEFORE? 
19 A. NO. 
20 Q. YOUR TESTIMONY TODAY IS THAT YOU'VE NEVER SEEN HER WITH 
21 DRUGS BEFORE? 
22 A. NOT --
23 Q. HAD YOU EVER ARRANGED DEALS WITH HER BEFORE? 
24 A. NO. 
25 Q. BUT YOU KNEW SHE HAD DRUGS JUST BECAUSE IT WAS FROM 
1 JO 
AROUND? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER AN INTERVIEW DONE WITH YOU BY AGENT 
WATANABE, ME, AND SHAWN GROGAN FROM THE WEBER/MORGAN STRIKE 
FORCE ON TUESDAY? 
A. AT THE PRISON? 
Q. CORRECT. 
A. YES. 
Q. OKAY. DO YOU RECALL US ASKING YOU THESE QUESTIONS? 
A. NO — IF I EVER HEARD FROM HER? 
Q. IF YOU'D EVER WITNESSED HER WITH DRUGS. 
A. NO. BESIDES THAT DAY, NO. 
Q. AND DO YOU RECALL US ASKING YOU THE QUESTION THEN OF 
WHETHER YOU HAD DEALT WITH HER PREVIOUSLY, EITHER ARRANGED TO 
DEAL THROUGH HER OR DEALT WITH HER DIRECTLY? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOUR ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION TODAY IS NO? 
A. NO. I ONLY PURCHASED ONCE. 
Q. YOU ONLY PURCHASED ONCE, MEANING THIS OCTOBER 14TH DATE? 
25 
A. 
Q. 
UH-HUH. 
DIDN'T Y( 
THAT YOU HAD 
A. 
Q. 
HAD 
NO. 
IN FACT, 
DU TELL 
BOUGHT 
DIDN'T 
US WHEN WE INTERVIEWED YOU AT 
FROM HER 
YOU TALK 
YOU PURCHASED YOUR DRUGS 
BEFORE? 
TO US ABOUT 
ORIGINALLY 
THE 
FROM 
FACT 
THE 
THAT 
SOMEBODY 
PRISON 
YOU 
129 
1 DIFFERENT? 
2 A. (WITNESS NODS.) 
3 Q. IS THAT CORRECT? 
4 A. YES. 
5 Q. OKAY. AND THAT YOU HAD RECENTLY MADE THE SWITCH TO THE 
6 DEFENDANT AS A SUPPLIER OF YOUR DRUGS, CORRECT? 
7 A. NO, NOT DAILY. 
8 Q. WELL, I'M NOT SAYING DAILY, BUT YOU HAD MADE A SWITCH 
9 WHERE YOU WOULD USE HER TO GET DRUGS. 
10 MR. COLE: I'M GONNA OBJECT, YOUR HONOR. SOUNDS 
11 LIKE COUNSEL'S TESTIFYING. 
12 THE COURT: I'LL ALLOW IT IN THE WAY OF A QUESTION, 
13 HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. RESTATE IT PLEASE. 
14 Q. (BY MR. MILES) DID YOU TELL US THAT YOU HAD PURCHASED 
15 DRUGS FROM HER BEFORE SWITCHING AWAY FROM YOUR OTHER SOURCE 
16 THAT YOU GOT THEM FROM? 
17 A. WELL, IT'S A CRACK GAME. YOU GO THPOUGH EVERYBODY. 
18 Q. OKAY. BUT YOU INDICATED TO US AT THE TIME YOU HAD GONE 
19 THROUGH THE DEFENDANT BEFORE; ISN'T THAT CORRECT? 
20 MR. COLE: SAME OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR, HE'S 
21 TESTIFYING. 
22 MR. MILES: WELL, YOUR HONOR, AT THIS TIME I'M GONNA 
23 MOVE TO DECLARE HER --
2 4 I THE COURT: I'LL ALLOW THE QUESTION. GO AHEAD AND 
ANSWER IF YOU UNDERSTAND IT. 
_L 4 U 
Q. (BY MR. MILES) DID YOU NOT TELL US THAT YOU HAD 
PURCHASED FROM THE DEFENDANT BEFORE? 
A. YES. 
Q. YOU DID TELL US THAT? 
A. I DID. 
Q. OKAY. AND YOU HAD A REASON FOR THAT; I S N ' T THAT TRUE? 
A. WHY I WENT THROUGH HER? 
Q. WHY YOU STARTED TO GO THROUGH HER. 
A. YEAH. 
Q. WHAT WAS THAT REASON? 
A. QUICKER. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY QUICKER? WE ASKED YOU TO FOLLOW 
THAT UP, CORRECT? 
A. GET IT FASTER. 
Q. SO WHAT HAPPENED THEN WHEN YOU ARRIVED AT THE GAS STATION 
ON I2TH AND MONROE? 
A. NOTHING. SHE PULLED UP. 
Q. WHAT HAPPENED AFTER SHE PULLED UP? 
A. I GOT WHAT I WANTED, THEY GOT WHAT THEY WANTED --
Q. OKAY. 
A. — AND WE LEFT. 
Q. SHE PULLED UP IN A VEHICLE NEAR THE VEHICLE YOU WERE IN 
WITH THE OFFICERS, CORRECT? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. OKAY. 
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MR. COLE: 
| THE COURT 
ANSWER. GO AHEAD. 
MR. COLE: 
Q. (BY MR. MILES) 
THEY GOT WHAT THEY 
I'M GONNA OBJECT AS LEADING, YOUR HONOR. 
: IT IS LEADING. BUT I'LL ALLOW THAT 
YEAH . 
WHEN YOU SAY YOU GOT WHAT YOU WANTED, 
WANTED, FIRST OFF, LET ME SEE IF I 
UNDERSTAND THIS CORRECTLY. DID YOU RECOGNIZE INDIVIDUALS WHO 
WERE IN THE OTHER ' VEHICLE? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. AND HOW DID YOU RECOGNIZE THEM? 
A. I KNEW WHO SHE WAS. 
Q. OKAY. AND WHO WAS SHE IN THE OTHER VEHICLE? 
A. LORNA. 
Q. OKAY. AND WAS THERE SOMEBODY ELSE IN THE VEHICLE WITH 
HER? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. WHO WAS THAT PERSON? 
A. I DON'T KNOW. 
Q. OKAY. AND WHERE WAS LORNA IN THE VEHICLE? 
A. PASSENGER SIDE. 
Q. OKAY. DID YOU GET OUT OF YOUR VEHICLE? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
L ^ 
YEAH. 
WHAT DID YOU DO ONCE YOU GOT OUT OF THE VEHICLE? 
WENT TO THEIR VEHICLE. 
AND WHAT DID YOU DO THEN AS YOU APPROACHED THEIR VEHICLE? 
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A. THEN I PURCHASED. 
Q. DESCRIBE SPECIFICALLY WHAT YOU DID PURCHASE. 
A. EXCHANGED. 
Q. WHAT? 
A. MONEY FOR DOPE. 
Q. WHO DID YOU GIVE YOUR MONEY TO? 
A. I JUST DROPPED IT IN HER LAP. 
Q. LAP OF? 
A. LORNA'S. 
Q. AND YOU INDICATE THAT YOU EXCHANGED THE MONEY FOP DOPE. 
WHO GAVE YOU THE DOPE? 
A. LORNA DID. 
Q. SHE PHYSICALLY HANDED YOU THE DOPE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. OR I REACHED IN AND GRABBED IT. 
Q. WHERE WAS THE DOPE THEN? 
A. ON HER LAP. 
Q. WHOSE LAP? 
A. LORNA'S. 
Q. 
THE 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
DID YOU 
VEHICLE 
NO. 
DO YOU 
JUST IN 
OKAY. 
HAVE 
0 
ANY 
RECALL HOW 
PLASTIC. 
I'LL 
EXHIBIT NUMBER 5 
SHOW 
, AND 
INTERACTION 
THE 
AT ALL WITH THE 
DRUGS WERE 
YOU WHAT 
ASK YOU 
PACKED? 
HAS BEEN MARKED AS 
IF YOU 
DRIVER OF 
STATE'S 
RECOGNIZE WHAT THIS IS? 
A. 
Q-
A. 
UH-HUH. 
WHAT IS IT? 
THE CRACK. 
Q. OKAY. IS THIS PACKAGED SIMILARLY TO THE DRUGS THAT YOU 
RECEIVED ON OCTOBER 14TH OF 2005 FROM THE DEFENDANT? 
A. LOOKS SMALLER. 
Q. OKAY. PACKAGING LOOKS SMALLER OR THE DRUGS LOOK SMALLER? 
A. THE DRUGS. 
9 I Q. OKAY. BUT THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT SHE HANDED 
10 YOU ON OCTOBER 14TH, 2005. 
11 A. YEAH. 
12 Q. OKAY. HOW DID YOU TAKE THE DRUGS, MEANING WHAT DID YOU 
13 DO WHEN SHE --
14 A. KEPT IT IN MY HAND, WALKED TO THE NEXT VEHICLE. 
15 Q. OKAY. YOU SAY YOU KEPT IT IN YOUR HAND? 
16 A. UH-HUH. 
17 Q. DID EVER REACH IN YOUR POCKETS AT ALL? 
18 A. UH-HUH. 
19 Q. WHAT DID YOU DO WHEN YOU WENT BACK TO THE OTHER VEHICLE? 
20 A. HANDED IT TO THEM. 
21 Q. WHAT HAPPENED AFTER YOU HANDED IT OVER? 
22 A. BRIAN GAVE ME A DUB AND I LEFT. 
23 Q. HOW DID YOU LEAVE? 
24 A. MY BROTHER, IN A DIFFERENT VEHICLE. 
25 Q. DID YOU KNOW THAT THE OTHER PERSON WITH MR. EAMES WAS A 
POLICE OFFICER AT THE TIME THIS HAPPENED? 
2 | A. UH-UH, NO. 
3 1 Q. WOULD YOU HAVE SOLD TO MR. EAMES IF YOU'D KNOWN THE OTHER-
4 PERSON WAS A POLICE OFFICER? 
5 A. NO. 
6 Q. WERE YOU PROMISED ANYTHING IN EXCHANGE FOR YOUR TESTIMONY 
7 I TODAY? 
A. NO. 
Q. AND YOU WERE ALREADY CHARGED, AS I INDICATED EARLIER, FOR 
10 I YOUR CONDUCT IN THIS CASE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
11 A. UH-HUH. 
12 Q. WERE YOU ARRESTED THEN ON OCTOBER 14TH RIGHT AFTER THIS 
13 HAPPENED ON THAT DAY FOR THIS OFFENSE? 
14 A. YES. 
15 Q. THE POLICE STOPPED YOU AND ARRESTED YOU BEFORE THEY LET 
16 YOU LEAVE? 
17 A. NO. THEY -- ARREST WARRANT WAS ISSUED. 
18 Q. OKAY. SO THEY PICKED YOU UP SOMETIME LATER; IS THAT 
19 CORRECT? 
20 A. A MONTH LATER. 
21 Q. OKAY. AND THAT OCCURRED AT YOUR HOME? 
22 A. UH-HUH. 
23 Q. DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT HAPPENED WHEN YOU WERE ARRESTED? 
2 4 A. THREE UNDERCOVER COPS WENT IN AND TRIED TO PURCHASE SOME 
25 MORE, AND I GOT HIT WITH ARRANGEMENT THAT I DID. 
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Q. THEY CAME TO YOUR HOME, UNDERCOVER AGAIN, AND ATTEMPTED 
TO PURCHASE FROM YOU? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. DID YOU REALIZE AT THAT TIME THEY WERE POLICE 
OFFICERS? 
A. YES. 
Q. WELL, INITIALLY, WHEN THEY FIRST CAME IN? 
A. NO, BECAUSE IT WAS THAT SAME ONE, THAT SAME GUY. 
Q. THE SAME GUY FROM --
A. BRIAN. 
Q. — FROM THIS DEAL ON THE 14TH? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. OKAY. AND YOU THOUGHT HE WAS JUST A FRIEND OF BRIAN AT 
THE TIME? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. WHAT IS IT THAT TIPPED YOU OFF THAT THEY WERE 
COPS? 
A. THAT WALKIE-TALKIE THING. 
Q. OKAY. YOU HEARD ONE OF THEIR RADIOS CHIRP? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. DID YOU NOTICE ONE OF THEM WEARING A HAT? 
A. UH-HUH, TWO OF THEM. 
Q. DID YOU NOTICE HUH? 
A. TWO WAS WEARING A HAT. 
Q. TWO WERE WEARING HATS? DO YOU RECALL ANYTHING THAT WAS 
l<iO 
ON THE HATS? 
A. THEY DIDN'T SAY POLICE. 
Q. OKAY. DO YOU RECALL IF IT SAID W-M-N-S-F? 
A. I WASN'T PAYING ATTENTION. 
Q. YOU DIDN'T NOTICE? 
A. I WAS HIGH. 
Q. YOU'D BEEN FRIENDS WITH LORNA FOR SOME TIME PRIOR TO THE 
14TH, CORRECT? 
A. YEAH, NOT KICKING WITH HER OR NOTHING. 
Q. OKAY. WELL, I ' M JUST — I 'M USING THE TERM FRIENDS 
BROADLY, BUT YOU'D KNOWN HER BEFORE THAT DAY, CORRECT? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. OKAY. DID YOU EVER OWE HER MONEY? 
A. NO. 
MR. MILES: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS? 
THE COURT: CROSS. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. COLE: 
Q. YOU SAID THAT YOU KNEW BRIAN EAMES BECAUSE HE USED TO 
CALL YOU FOR DOPE. 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. OKAY. HOW OFTEN DID BRIAN EAMES CALL YOU FOR DRUGS? 
2 3 I A. HE CALLED ME FIVE TIMES BEFORE THAT HAPPENED. 
2 4 Q. OKAY. SO HE CALLED YOU FREQUENTLY, SO YOU WERE ACTUALLY 
25 DISTRIBUTING FOR MORE THAN YOU ACTUALLY GOT CHARGED FOR. 
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1 A. SAY THAT AGAIN? 
2 Q. YOU WERE DISTRIBUTING A LOT MORE THAN THE ONE CHARGE YOU 
3 I ACTUALLY GOT CONVICTED FOR; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A. UH-HUH. 
5 1 Q. AND YOU TOLD HIM YOU DIDN'T HAVE DRUGS ON YOU. 
6 I A. HE KNEW. 
Q. WHO KNEW? 
A. BRIAN. 
Q. HOW DO HE KNOW YOU DIDN'T HAVE DRUGS ON YOU? 
A. BECAUSE HE SMOKED WITH ME BEFORE. 
Q. OKAY. HOW WOULD HE KNOW YOU DIDN'T HAVE DRUGS ON YOU? 
A. HOW DOES HE KNOW? 
Q. UH-HUH. 
A. BECAUSE HE'S ALL — EVERY TIME HE HAD TO CALL ME, HE 
ALWAYS HAD TO WAIT FOR SOMEBODY TO COME, TO COME DROP IT OFF 
Q. OKAY. SO YOU'RE ASSUMING THAT HE KNOWS THAT YOU JUST 
DON'T HAVE THEM WITH YOU ALL THE TIME. 
A. (WITNESS NODS.) 
Q. BECAUSE THAT'S THE PATTERN. 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. OKAY. BUT NO ONE SEARCHED YOU, DID THEY, TO SEE IF YOU 
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HAD 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
DRUGS 
THAT 
YEAH. 
ON 
DAY 7 
(WITNESS 
YOU? 
) 
SHAKES HEAD.) 
1 Q. DID THEY GIVE YOU THAT HUNDRED-DOLLAR BILL AND THEN TELL 
2 YOU THAT THEY WOULDN'T LET YOU GO WITHOUT ONE OF THEM GOING 
3 WITH YOU? OR DID THEY HOLD ON TO THE 100-DOLLAR BILL? 
4 A. THEY GAVE IT TO ME. 
5 Q. THEY GAVE IT TO YOU? THEN INSISTED ON GOING WITH YOU? 
6 A. UH-HUH. 
7 Q. OKAY. DID YOU SUSPECT ANY TIME THEY WERE COPS? 
8 A. UH-UH. 
9 Q. AND YOU'RE SURE THIS IS WHAT HE SAID WAS $20 WORTH OF 
10 COCAINE? 
11 A. UH-HUH. 
12 Q. OKAY. AND WHAT DID YOU DO TO MAKE A LIVING BEYOND THIS? 
13 I MEAN HOW DID YOU PAY YOUR BILLS? 
14 A. I WORKED AT THE D.I. 
15 Q. ISN'T IT TRUE YOU ALSO SOLD CLOTHES AND OTHER THINGS ON 
16 THE SIDE? 
17 A. UH-HUH. 
18 Q. OKAY. AND DID LORNA EVER OWE YOU ANY MONEY FOR ANY 
19 CLOTHES OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE THAT YOU SOLD TO HER? 
20 A. NO. 
21 Q. OKAY. WHEN YOU TALKED TO LORNA ON THE PHONE, YOU SAID 
22 YOU CALLED HER ON THE PHONE. YOU CALLED WHOEVER YOU CALLED 
23 TO GET THE DRUGS — 
24 A. (WITNESS NODS.) 
25 Q. -- ON THE PHONE. 
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A. UH-HUH. 
Q. DID YOU ASK THEM, HEY, YOU KNOW, I NEED SOME, OR HOW DID 
YOU KNOW THAT SHE WAS GONNA MEET YOU WITH DRUGS? 
A. BECAUSE I SAID NEED A C. NOTE. 
Q. OKAY. ISN'T THAT A REFERENCE TO A HUNDRED-DOLLAR BILL? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. OKAY. IS THAT ALL A REFERENCE TO A QUANTITY OF DRUGS? 
A. UH-HUH, AUTOMATIC, YEAH. 
Q. YOU ALSO SAID EARLIER THAT YOU'D ONLY PURCHASED FROM 
LORNA THIS TIME, BUT APPARENTLY YOU ALSO TOLD THEM THAT YOU 
PURCHASED FROM HER MULTIPLE TIMES. SO WHICH IS IT? 
A. WHEN I WENT THERE, THEY ASKED ME IF IT WAS MORE THAN 
ONCE, YES. 
Q. OKAY. WAS LORNA SEATED IN THE PASSENGER SIDE FRONT OR 
REAR OF THE CAR? 
A. WHAT DO YOU MEAN? 
Q. WHEN YOU APPROACHED THE VEHICLE --
A. WAS SHE IN THE FRONT SEAT? 
Q. WAS SHE IN THE FRONT SEAT OR THE BACK SEAT? 
A. FRONT. 
Q. DID YOU EVER GET IN THE CAR? 
A. UH-UH. 
Q. 
A. 
Q_ 
OKAY. DID YOU LEAN INTO THE CAR WINDOW? 
UH-HUH. 
OFAY. AND I THINK WE HAVE ONE PICTURE OVER HERE PLACED 
1 IN FRONT OF WHAT'S BEEN MARKED DEFENDANT'S 6. IS THAT ABOUT 
2 WHERE THE DRUG DEAL TOOK PLACE? 
3 A. YES. 
4 Q. AND IS THE SILVER CAR AWAY FROM THE GAS TANKS OR GAS 
5 PUMPS ABOUT WHERE YOU GUYS WERE PARKED, FROM YOUR 
6 RECOLLECTION? 
7 A. WOULD HAVE BEEN CLOSER. 
8 Q. CLOSER TO THE GAS TANKS? 
9 A. NO. CLOSER THIS WAY. BY THE GARBAGE CAN. 
10 Q. OKAY. SO FURTHER BACK? WHERE DID LORNA'S CAR END UP 
11 PARKED AT? 
12 A. IN THE FRONT. 
13 Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN IN THE FRONT? 
14 A. BY --
15 Q. WERE YOU GUYS PARKED NOSE TO NOSE OR — 
16 A. YEAH, NOSE NO NOSE. 
17 Q. THE CARS WERE PARKED LIKE THIS, NOT LIKE THIS? 
18 A. UH-UH, FACE TO FACE. 
19 Q. FACE TO FACE. OKAY. DOES THAT FAIRLY ACCURATELY 
20 REPRESENT THE PUMP OR THE STATION AT THE TIME THAT THIS WENT 
21 DOWN? 
22 A. YEAH. 
23 Q. OKAY. TURN THAT BACK OVER TO THE EVIDENCE PILE. NOW, 
2 4 ISN'T IT TRUE THAT YOU WERE INITIALLY CHARGED IN THIS SAME 
25 ACTION WITH A FIRST DEGREE FELONY? 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
YEAH. 
AND THAT 
(WITNESS 
AND PART 
YOU PLED 
NODS.) 
OF THAT ] 
IT DOWN A LEVEL? 
=LEA IS YOU TOLD THEM 
JUST YOU, YOU WERE JUST THE MIDDLE PERSON? 
A. 
Q. 
HECK, NO 
DID YOU r FELL THEM THAT YOU WERE THE ONE 
THAT 
THAT 
IT WASN 
WAS 
T 
ACTUALLY 
DISTRIBUTING? 
A. NO. I DIDN'T EVEN TRY TO FIGHT IT. I JUST TOOK A PLEA 
BARGAIN. 
Q. WELL, IF YOU DIDN'T FIGHT IT, WHY DIDN'T YOU PLEAD IT 
DOWN TO A -- WHY DIDN'T YOU PLEAD TO THE FIRST? 
MR. MILES: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR — 
THE WITNESS: I PLEA BARGAINED. 
MR. MILES: -- SPECULATION. 
THE COURT: I'LL ALLOW HER TO ANSWER. 
Q. (BY MR. COLE) YOU PLEA BARGAINED IT DOWN. 
A. YES. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. SO I DIDN'T HAVE TO TAKE FIVE TO LIFE. 
Q. OKAY. AND THAT MEANS THAT WHEN YOU GO BEFORE THE PAROLE 
BOARD, YOU'RE GONNA BE ABLE TO TELL THE PAROLE BOARD, LOOK, I 
WAS JUST THE MIDDLE PERSON. AND SO YOU WILL GET A BENEFIT 
FROM THIS, WON'T YOU? 
A. IT'S ALREADY ON PAPER. 
1 Q. OFAY. 
2 A. POLICE --
3 Q. BUT YOU'RE GONNA GET RELEASED THIS NOVEMBEP . 
4 A. (WITNESS NODS.) 
5 Q. WOULD YOU HAVE EXPECTED TO GET RELEASED IF YOU'D PLED 
6 GUILTY AS CHARGED? 
7 A. I DID PLEAD GUILTY. 
8 Q. WELL, YOU DIDN'T PLEAD GUILTY TO THE HIGHER CHARGE; YOU 
9 PLED GUILTY FOR A REDUCED CHARGE. 
10 A. YEAH. THE ONLY REASON WHY IT WAS HIGHER BECAUSE IT WAS A 
11 GAS STATION WITHIN THE — THE PUBLIC PLACE, SO IT'S AUTOMATIC 
12 FIVE TO LIFE. BUT REGARDLESS OF BEING A SECOND DEGREE, IT'S 
13 A DISTRIBUTION CHARGE, SO I PLED --
14 Q. THAT'S A LESSER CHARGE. 
15 A. UH-HUH. 
16 Q. THEY'RE BOTH DISTRIBUTION, BUT ONE'S A LESSER, WITH LESS 
17 TIME — 
18 A. OFAY. BUT THE ONES THAT MAKE IT HIGHEP IS BECAUSE IT'S A 
19 PUBLIC PLACE. 
20 Q. OKAY. BUT YOU GET PAROLED EARLIEP BY PLEADING TO THE 
21 LOWER CHARGE THAN TO THE ORIGINAL CHARGE, TRUE? 
22 A. OH, YEAH, BECAUSE I SEEN THE BOARD. 
2 3 Q. OKAY. AND YOU CAN GO TO THE BOARD AND TELL THE BOARD, 
24 LOOK, I WAS JUST THE MIDDLE PERSON, I WAS A DOPE ADDICT, AND 
25 I SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN DOING, BUT I WAS FEEDING MY HABIT. 
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1 ISN'T THAT WHAT YOU'RE GONNA TELL THE BOARD? 
2 A. NO. 
3 I Q. YOU WERE GONNA GO IN AND TAKE RESPONSIBILITY AND SAY 
YOU'PE A DRUG DEALER. 
5 1 A. OF COURSE. BUT I'M NOT A DRUG DEALER. NEVER HAD — 
6 Q. YOU WEREN'T A DRUG DEALER. 
7 | A. I DON'T HAVE DOPE ON ME. I'VE NEVER HAD DOPE ON ME. 
Q. ALSO, YOU SAID THAT YOU DROPPED MONEY IN LORNA'S LAP AND 
9 I PICKED UP DRUGS FROM HER LAP. 
10 A. UH-HUH. 
11 Q. SHE NEVER ACTUALLY HANDED STUFF TO YOU? 
12 A. UH-UH. 
13 Q. DO YOU REMEMBER HER HOLDING A BILL UP AND LOOKING AT IT? 
14 A. NO. 
15 Q. OKAY. 
16 A. I DIDN'T PAY ATTENTION. 
17 Q. DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT THE DISTANCE WAS BETWEEN THE 
18 VEHICLES? 
19 A. UH-HUH. 
20 Q. ABOUT HOW FAR? 
21 A. WELL, PICTURE THEM TWO TABLES AT THAT PARKING LOT, LIKE 
22 THAT. 
23 Q. ABOUT LIKE THAT. 
24 A. I DIDN'T HAVE TO WALK FAR. 
25 Q. IT WAS NOSE TO NOSE? 
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23 
24 
25 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. OKAY. AND EVEN WHEN YOU WERE ARRESTED, YOU WERE HIGH. 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. AND YOU DIDN'T NOTICE THAT THE ONE OF THE GUYS THERE HAD 
A BADGE ON? 
A. HE DIDN'T HAVE A BADGE ON. 
Q. OR A WEBER/MORGAN LOGO? 
A. PROBABLY A HAT. 
Q. A HAT. DID YOU NOTICE YOUR KIDS PRESENT IN THE HOUSE? 
A. COURSE. 
Q. AND YOU WERE STILL HIGH. 
A. UH-HUH. 
MR. COLE: THAT'S ALL I HAVE, YOUR HONOR. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MILES: 
Q. JUST TO BE CLEAR, ON THE CASE THAT YOU'VE PLED GUILTY TO 
THAT YOU'RE IN PRISON ON, YOU PLED GUILTY TO A SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY AS OPPOSED TO A FIRST, AND THAT WAS YOUR INCENTIVE TO 
PLEAD GUILTY SO THAT YOU'D AVOID A FIVE-TO-LIFE, CORRECT? 
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